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Bene¯ciaries of Social Security face restrictions on how much they can earn without
incurring the earnings test (ET). In 2000, President Clinton eliminated the ET between
age 65 and 70. In this paper I evaluate how this removal impacts the long{term ¯nances
of the Trust Fund. I ¯nd that starting in 2006 the Social Security Administration is
actually saving money and that the removal appears to be Pareto{e±cient. A removal
of the remaining part of the ET is likely to be even less costly and to produce larger
increases in labor supply and contributions.
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JEL classi¯cation codes: H55, J261 Introduction
Bene¯ciaries of Social Security face restrictions on how much they can earn without incurring
the earnings test (ET). Before year 2000, the bene¯ts above the annual exempt amount were
subject to a 50 percent tax for those below age 65 and were subject to a 33 percent tax
for those between age 65 and 70. On April 7, 2000, President Clinton signed the \Senior
Citizens Freedom to Work Act of 2000," which eliminated the 33 percent earnings test.1
Although bene¯ts that are taxed away are actuarially adjusted and later returned to the
bene¯ciary as soon as she either reaches age 70 or her earnings fall below the earnings test,
empirical evidence seems to suggest that workers perceive the tax to be permanent (Gruber
and Orszag, 2003).
The earnings test removal (ETR) was seen as an opportunity to increase the number of
retired people going back to work. Since the Trust Fund is projected to become insolvent in
about forty years, policy makers' main concern was that the ETR might worsen the long{
term ¯nances of the fund. Fifteen years ago, Honig and Reimers (1989) estimated the cost
of a complete removal to be close to 2 billion dollars or a 2.3 percent increase in the present
discounted value of the stream of bene¯ts, the so called Social Security Wealth (SSW). A
few years later, Gustman and Steinmeier (1991) estimated the budgetary cost of an ETR for
bene¯ciaries above age 65 considering di®erent behavioral assumptions. The largest estimated
cost is equal to 92 billion dollars when workers and retirees time their application to maximize
the SSW. The cost drops to 43 billion dollars if liquidity constrains force workers to claim
bene¯ts as soon as they retire, and to -12 billion dollars, in which case the administration
actually saves money, if workers claim at age 65, meaning as soon as they are not subject to
the ET.
Following the ETR, economists have shown that it has positive labor supply e®ects (Tran
1The legislation, e®ective retroactively to January 1, 2000, still requires that the test's higher exempt
amount be applied to bene¯ciaries' earnings in the year they attain their normal retirement age.
32004, Song 2004, Loughran and Haider 2005, Song and Manchester 2005) but, despite the
di±cult ¯nancial situation of the Trust Fund, its long{term impact on the budget has not
been investigated yet. The aim of this paper is to estimate this impact.
2 The impact of the ETR on the Trust Fund
2.1 Changes in claiming behavior
The ETR can only a®ect workers' SSW if it induces them to change their claiming behavior.
Figure 1 shows the dramatic change in the probability of claiming within a month of reaching
the normal retirement age (NRA) conditional on not having claimed before (the hazard rate).2
Workers born in 1935, the ¯rst cohort not subject to the ET, are 25 percentage points more
likely (65% to 90%) to claim their bene¯ts at the NRA than workers born just one year
earlier.
This jump happened despite a decreasing trend in the hazard. Between 1989 and 1999
the hazard rate dropped from 70 percent to 60 percent. This decrease is probably due to the
increase in the actuarial adjustment for claiming after the NRA. This adjustment, called the
delayed retirement credit (DRC), increased during this period from 3 percent to 5.5 percent
and is scheduled to reach 8 percent for the 1943 cohort. A higher DRC gives incentives for
late claiming, and generates a reduction in the hazard at the NRA. For women, who face
longer life{expectancy, the reduction in the hazard rate seems less pronounced.
The increase in the hazard rate due to the ETR generates a gap between the cumulative
distribution functions of entitlement age (Figures 2 and 3). Notice that the CDFs for workers
born in 1934 (1935, etc.) converge towards the 1935 CDF with a 1 year (2 years, etc.) lag,
which corresponds to the year of the ETR. Most workers who would have otherwise claimed
2The NRA is increasing over time, and what was known as the 65-spike should now be renamed the
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Figure 1: Hazard rates at the normal retirement age for cohort 1924
to 1938. Men (1) and women (0). Based on 1% of the SSA's Master
Bene¯ciary Data.
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Figure 2: CDF of entitlement age. pre-1932 (-), 1933 (x), 1934 (+), 1935 (o).
after their NRA respond to the ETR by claiming at the NRA. On the other side, there do
not seem to be changes in distribution of claiming ages before age 65.
Despite the rising DRC, these adjustments are not yet actuarially fair, and the observed
changes in claiming behavior are likely to produce changes in workers' SSW. For a worker
born in year c who claims at age x, NRAc < x · 70 £ 12, the SSW evaluated at the NRA
depends on the cohort{speci¯c probability of survival until age (in months) t, pc;NRAc(t), the
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Figure 3: CDF of the claiming age. Based on 1% of SSA's Continuous Work History Sample.
7The SSW for a worker who claims at the NRA, but would have otherwise claimed at age





(1 + i)t¡NRAc ; (2)
where ±t = ± £ 1(t < x) represents the change in the federal income tax rate, ¿, that is due
to the earlier claiming, a concept that will be clari¯ed in section 2.2.2.







In order to evaluate the cohort{speci¯c percentage change, I weight the relative impor-
tance of each claiming age x. De¯ning ¯(x) as the di®erence between the CDFs that is due












To construct the ¯s I use the youngest cohort that has not been a®ected by the ETR
(1929) and the oldest cohort that has been entirely a®ected by the ETR (1935).
2.2 The Social Security Wealth
These changes in the SSW, evaluated at the NRA, di®er across cohorts mainly because of
di®erent DRCs, di®erent NRAs, and di®erent cohort-speci¯c mortality tables. Higher DRCs
make it more attractive for worker to claim their bene¯ts later. The NRA is 65 for workers
born before 1938. Staring with the 1938 cohort, the NRA increases by 2 months every year.3
3After a 12 year break at age 66 (between cohort 1943 and cohort 1954), the NRA is scheduled to reach
age 67 for workers born in 1960 and later.
8This increase squeezes the age interval a®ected by the ETR, reducing the changes in SSW.
Mortality tables are probably the most important factor when calculating the SSW, and
adverse selection has to be taken into account in order to make sound assumptions.
2.2.1 Mortality estimates for late claimers
Since SSA's actuarial adjustments are based on population wide mortality tables, workers
with higher life expectancy have an incentive to claim later much in the same way annuitants
with higher life expectancy have an incentive to buy more annuities Hurd et al. (2004).
Because of this selection, it is certainly problematic to use SSA life tables for late claimers.
Using these tables I would certainly overstate the long{term cost of the ETR. Waldron (2001,
2004) uses the 1973 CPS data linked to Social Security death records to show that even after
controlling for education, male workers who claim at age 65 or later have considerably lower
mortality log-odds, and that these di®erences are widening with age. Men born between 1906
and 1931 who claim at 65 or later have log-odds that are about 20 to 30 percentage points
lower than average. Unfortunately she does not carry out the same analysis for women.
If using the SSA's mortality tables generate an upper bound for the budgetary cost, life
insurance annuity tables (Johansen, 1997) are likely to generate a lower bound. People who
buy life insurance tend to live longer, and their mortality tables might better re°ect late
claimers' mortality tables. Since annuity tables are periodic, meaning that they measure the
probability of survival at a given point in time, I need to convert them into cohort{speci¯c
tables. Mortality log-odds after age 60 tend to be linear with respect to age; therefore, I ¯rst
measure the distance between the SSA's and the annuitants' periodic mortality log{odds
and then impute this same distance to SSA's cohort{speci¯c log{odds to generate annuity
cohort{speci¯c log{odds (see Appendix C).
For men, the di®erence between the \annuity" and the \SSA" log{odds is approximately
constant across ages and equal to 0.55 (see Equation 7 in Appendix C). For women, the gap









Panel A: Female sample
Married 0.75 63.71 -0.24 -7.48 1638
Widowed 0.10 11.51 0.15 6.41 1638
Black 0.07 10.11 0.05 2.67 1638
Hispanic 0.05 8.24 0.00 0.29 1637
High School 0.47 35.46 -0.10 -2.87 1638
College 0.35 27.15 0.12 3.54 1638
Household Wealth (10,000) 33.58 20.02 4.19 0.92 1638
Panel B: Male sample
Married 0.82 76.53 0.01 0.54 1571
Widowed 0.05 7.60 0.01 0.84 1571
Black 0.07 9.58 0.01 0.71 1565
Hispanic 0.05 8.13 0.01 0.66 1565
High School 0.38 28.57 -0.15 -4.72 1565
College 0.42 30.71 0.18 5.68 1565
Household Wealth (10,000) 34.10 18.61 15.64 3.69 1571
is 1.1, but is decreasing with age. In terms of life-expectancy at age 65, the di®erence is
approximately equal to 3.3 years for men (21.1 vs. 16.8 for the 1941 cohort) and 3.7 years
for women (23.9 vs. 20.2 for the 1941 cohort).
The predictions will be carried out using the SSA's mortality estimates (upper bound)
and the annuitants' mortality estimates (lower bound). The average of the two is very close
to Waldron's estimate, though it is likely that, since she controls for education and I am not,
even this average is likely to understate the late claimers' probability of survival.
2.2.2 Earnings, Income and the ET
Social Security bene¯ts are not always tax exempt, and the ETR might have in°uenced
the amount of Social Security bene¯ts subject to the federal income tax (FIT). Since 1983,
if bene¯ciaries ¯le a federal tax return as \an individual," (\a couple") and the combined
10adjusted gross income plus tax{exempt interest is between $25,000 and $34,000 ($32,000 and
$44,000), they pay taxes on up to 50 percent of their Social Security bene¯ts. Moreover,
since 1993, if the combined income is more than $34,000 ($44,000), up to 85 percent of
the Social Security bene¯ts are subject to income tax. Because these thresholds are not
being adjusted for in°ation over time, more and more bene¯ciaries pay income taxes on their
bene¯ts (Orszag, 2002).
The IRS collects the tax, but the revenues due to the 1983 reform go to the Social Security
Trust Fund and those due to the 1993 reform go to the Medicare Trust Fund. Table 2.2.2
shows that between 1990 and 2002 the number of tax returns that contained taxable Social
Security bene¯ts doubled from 5 to 10 million, and the fraction of taxable bene¯ts increased
from 8.8 percent to 24.1 percent. During the same period the amount of taxes collected
increased from 8 billion dollars (in 2004 dollars) to more than 21 billion dollars. The per{
return tax increased from $1,500 to $2,000. At the time of the ETR, the corresponding
average tax rate (¿ in equation 2), calculated dividing the average tax by the average total
bene¯t of those workers who ¯led a return, is close to 9 percent.
Before the ETR, the main reason people claimed after their NRA was to avoid the ET.
In other words, would{be late claimers have earnings above the ET thresholds. But, these
workers now claim and collect their bene¯ts as soon as they reach their NRA, and this
makes them more likely to have part of their bene¯ts be subject to the federal income tax.
Table 3 shows that after 2000, half of the workers who claim their bene¯ts at the NRA
would be subject to the ET had the ET not been eliminated.4 Overall, the probability
of being subject to the 50 (85) percent FIT, (denoted in the table > FIT and > FIT2),
conditional on being subject to the ET (j > ET), is close to 90 (75) percent. How much
lower would these probabilities be if workers decided to retire and had no earnings? Keeping
4After the 2000 ETR, I assume that the ET threshold would have been in real terms equal to the 1999
ET threshold.
11Table 2: Federal income tax of Social Security bene¯ts (FIT). Values are expressed in $2004.
Source: SSA IRS IRS SSA IRS Medicare ALL ALL











Tax Year billions millions billions in % billions billions per re-
turn
in %
1990 333.5 5.1 28.5 8.8 8.0 0.0 1,575 6.8
1991 343.2 5.3 28.3 8.5 8.1 0.0 1,529 6.6
1992 350.0 5.5 29.1 8.5 7.7 0.0 1,401 6.0
1993 355.7 5.7 29.0 8.3 6.8 0.0 1,197 5.2
1994 361.5 5.9 49.2 13.8 6.3 4.8 1,894 8.2
1995 364.6 6.6 56.6 15.7 7.0 4.9 1,803 7.8
1996 372.2 7.4 64.1 17.6 7.6 4.2 1,600 6.9
1997 378.7 8.3 72.5 19.5 10.0 5.9 1,912 8.3
1998 379.1 8.9 79.6 21.0 11.5 7.5 2,137 9.2
1999 386.9 9.5 85.2 22.5 13.7 9.7 2,457 10.6
2000 397.1 10.6 98.6 25.5 12.6 8.0 1,939 8.4
2001 407.5 10.7 99.6 25.1 13.2 8.7 2,051 8.9
2002 410.5 10.8 98.2 24.1 12.7 8.5 1,962 8.5
everything else constant the answer can be found by adding earnings W to the FIT thresholds,
> FIT +Wj > ET. The probability for workers who claim after the NRA when the ET was
still in place drops from 93 percent to 39 percent. The numbers are very similar for workers
who claim at the NRA after the ETR. When I compute the SSW I assume that between the
NRA and the age at which workers would have claimed in the absence of the ETR (x) the
probability of being subject to the FIT increases by 50 percent. In terms of equation 2, this
means that I set ± = 0:5.
2.3 The long{term budgetary impact
The last two elements needed to compute the change in fSSW are the real interest rate
and the average monthly bene¯t. I estimate the budgetary impact using three di®erent
interest rates: 2.1 percent, 2.9 percent, and 3.6 percent, which correspond to the high cost,
intermediate cost, and low cost assumptions used in the 2006 SSA Trustees Report. Table 4
shows the percentage changes in SSW for men without dependent spouse (independent),
12Table 3: Probability of having bene¯ts subject to the ET and the FIT.
Claim before 2000 Claim after 2000
Claim at NRA Claim after the NRA Claim at NRA Claim after the NRA
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
> FITj > ET 0.77 0.43 0.93 0.26 0.95 0.22 0.94 0.24
> FIT + Wj > ET 0.30 0.46 0.39 0.49 0.38 0.49 0.53 0.50
> FIT2j > ET 0.60 0.50 0.78 0.42 0.85 0.36 0.91 0.28
> FIT2 + Wj > ET 0.24 0.43 0.28 0.45 0.24 0.43 0.40 0.49
N=198 N=376 N=169 N=148
Notes: Based on the HRS (1992{2002). > ET (> FIT) represents the probability of being subject to the
ET (FIT). FIT2 represents the second threshold, above which 85 percent of the bene¯ts become taxable.
W stands for earnings. After the 2000 ETR, I assume that the ET threshold would have been in real terms
equal to the 1999 ET threshold. For example, > FIT2 + Wj > ET represents the probability that
conditional on being subject to the ET income without earnings is above the second federal income tax
threshold and up to 85 percent of the bene¯ts are taxable.
women whose bene¯ts are based on their own earnings history (independent), and couples
with dependent bene¯ts using the two di®erent assumptions about mortality and the three
di®erent assumptions about the real interest rates. I restrict the analysis to workers born
before 1944, but the results based on these nine cohorts that I analyze seem su±cient to
grasp the trends in the data.
When I use the SSA's mortality assumptions, independent men show large percentage
changes in SSW (Panel A). Using the intermediate interest rate, the change is equal to 7.93
percentage points for the 1935 cohort. However, because of the downward trend in mortality
it drops to 4.05 percentage points for the 1943 cohort. When I use the annuitants' mortality
table instead (Panel B), the change is only 4.16 percentage points for the 1935 cohort and
0.77 percentage points for the 1943 one. For this cohort, using the lower real interest rate
(2.1 percent), the percentage change becomes negative, meaning that SSA's bene¯t payments
decrease.
However, based on SSA's 2004 Bene¯ts and Earnings Public-Use File men without a
dependent spouse represent only around 25 percent of the population. Most men and women
are either married or widowed, and their SSW changes are, due to their joint probability
13Table 4: Changes in SSW (in percent) using cohort-speci¯c SSA and annuitants' mortality.
Group Single women Single men Married couples
Real int. rate (in%) 2.1 2.9 3.6 2.1 2.9 3.6 2.1 2.9 3.6
Panel A: SSA's Mortality Assumptions
1935 3.74 5.01 6.16 6.66 7.93 9.09 2.73 3.90 4.96
1936 3.71 4.98 6.13 6.60 7.88 9.03 2.72 3.89 4.95
1937 2.70 3.95 5.08 5.57 6.83 7.97 1.78 2.93 3.98
1938 2.79 4.03 5.15 5.67 6.92 8.04 1.88 3.02 4.05
1939 1.88 3.06 4.14 4.73 5.93 7.01 1.04 2.14 3.14
1940 1.90 3.06 4.10 4.73 5.89 6.94 1.10 2.17 3.14
1941 1.06 2.16 3.17 3.84 4.96 5.96 0.33 1.36 2.29
1942 1.10 2.17 3.13 3.83 4.91 5.88 0.38 1.37 2.27
1943 0.33 1.35 2.27 3.02 4.05 4.98 -0.33 0.62 1.47
Panel B: Annuitants' Mortality Assumptions
1935 1.40 2.60 3.69 2.97 4.16 5.24 0.52 1.63 2.64
1936 1.38 2.58 3.67 2.94 4.12 5.20 0.51 1.62 2.63
1937 0.40 1.58 2.66 1.97 3.14 4.21 -0.39 0.70 1.69
1938 0.50 1.66 2.72 2.06 3.22 4.27 -0.31 0.77 1.76
1939 -0.35 0.77 1.79 1.21 2.32 3.34 -1.09 -0.05 0.90
1940 -0.28 0.80 1.80 1.25 2.33 3.32 -1.01 0.01 0.93
1941 -1.06 -0.02 0.93 0.46 1.51 2.45 -1.72 -0.75 0.14
1942 -0.97 0.04 0.95 0.51 1.52 2.43 -1.63 -0.69 0.17
1943 -1.67 -0.71 0.17 -0.20 0.77 1.64 -2.28 -1.38 -0.56
14of survival, signi¯cantly lower.5 Using a real interest rate of 2.9 percent, and the SSA's
mortality assumptions, the changes drop from 3.90 percentage points for the 1935 cohort
to 0.62 percentage points for the 1943 one. With the annuity tables, the changes starting
with the 1939 cohort are already close to zero. Changes for independent women tend to lie
between those for independent men and dependent couples.
Finally, I use these results to estimate the budgetary impact on the Trust Fund. According
to the HRS, women who claim late and are subject to the ET receive on average almost the
same monthly bene¯t amount as men do (approximately $1,100 in 2004 dollars). Multiplying
the individual SSW changes by the number of workers who claim their bene¯ts after the
NRA and before age 70 (for each cohort there are approximately 120,000 late claimers), and
summing the e®ect over the three di®erent types of bene¯ciaries gives the cohort{speci¯c
budgetary e®ect, assuming that the removal has no e®ects on earnings, and therefore on
contributions.6 Table 5 shows these e®ects for cohorts 1935 to 1943 using the SSA mortality
tables (Panel A) and using the annuity tables (Panel B). In Panel A, depending on the
interest rate used, for the 1935 cohort the change in SSW that is due to the ETR varies
between 0.86 and 1.15 billion dollars ($2004). These changes drop over time, and the last
cohort we consider has changes that range between 0.07 and 0.41 billion dollars. Using the
annuity tables, for each cohort these changes drop by between 0.5 and 0.7 billion dollars,
resulting in negative changes for workers born at or after 1938 when the 2.1 percent interest
rate is used and workers born at or after 1940 when the 2.9 percent interest rate is used.
Each of these e®ects is evaluated at the workers' NRA. In order to compute the total
e®ect evaluated in year 2000, we need to take the discounted sum of the cohort{speci¯c
budgetary e®ects. The total e®ect ranges between 4.12 and 6.46 billion dollars for SSA's
5In my simulations, I assume that for married couples the wife is two years younger than her husband and
receives dependent spouse bene¯ts as soon as her husband claims his bene¯ts. Both assumptions are close to
the sample averages, and small perturbations of these assumptions generate negligible changes in the results.
6For each cohort approximately 20 percent are independent women, 25 percent are independent women
and 55 percent are dependent couples.
15mortality assumptions and between -0.64 and 3.36 billion dollars for the annuitant's mortality
assumptions. Notice, that since the e®ects for the 1943 cohort are close to zero or negative,
extending the analysis to workers born after 1943 would only lower the total budgetary e®ect.
Recent studies have shown that the ETR increased labor supply. Loughran and Haider
(2005) use CPS data to estimate the change in earnings due to the ETR. Their identifying
assumption is that people aged 70-71 are not a®ected by the ETR, and that in the absence
of the ETR, their earnings would have followed the same trend as the earnings of workers
aged 65 (the NRA in their sample) to 69. They estimate a change in earnings of $2,100 for
men and $500 for women. They do not ¯nd signi¯cant di®erences in their estimates across
ages.
Multiplying these estimates by the payroll tax rate (12.4 percent) and by the size of the
population in the Social Security area (around 4.5 million men and 5.2 million women, SSA's
2005 Annual Statistical Supplement) gives the total yearly change in contributions. Since the
increase in earnings due to the ETR happens only between the NRA and age 70, younger
cohorts have lower increases in the present discounted value of contributions. In order to
estimate a cohort{speci¯c e®ect on the contributions, the increase in the NRA has to be
taken into account. These changes are approximately equal to 1.4 billion dollars for the 1935
cohort and 1.2 billion dollars for the 1943 cohort.
But, whenever these additional yearly earnings enter the bene¯t formal (the total real
earnings are larger then the lowest 35 years of earnings), SSA recomputes the bene¯ts. In
order to take this additional change in the SSW into account, I use SSA's 2004 Bene¯ts
and Earnings Public-Use File.7 What I can do is to simulate the e®ect on the bene¯ts of an
increase of $500 ($2100) in earnings for women (men) between the age of 65 and 69. The aver-
age increase in monthly bene¯ts is $1.87 for independent women and $4.13 for men (the data
7Since earnings histories are available only for SSA bene¯ciaries the data cannot be used to estimate the
e®ect of the ETR on earnings.
16does not contain information on marital status).8 Then I calculate the present discounted
value of this average increase in bene¯ts using SSA's mortality assumptions (this time the
estimate is based on the entire population of bene¯ciaries) and sum it across bene¯ciary
types (independent women, independent men, and dependent couples).
Looking at Panel C it is immediately clear that the recomputation tends to neutralize the
increase in contributions. The net gain lies between 0.07 and 0.25 billion dollars for the 1935
cohort and between 0.16 and 0.31 billion dollars for the 1943 cohort. Using Loughran and
Haider's estimates, the bene¯ts from the increased contributions outweigh the costs among
younger cohorts. Without using any estimates of labor supply e®ects, it is still possible to
calculate the change in earnings that would be necessary to keep the Trust Fund ¯nancial
situation unchanged. Using intermediate assumptions, both in terms of mortality and interest
rates (the average between Panel A's and Panel B's estimate that uses a 2.9 percent interest
rate), the break{even change in earnings is equal $5.618 for the 1935 cohort and only $61 for
the 1943 cohort.
Subtracting the total change in contribution evaluated in year 2000 from the ¯nal change











Nc;t¢W t £ 0:124
(1 + i)t¡NRAc+c¡1935 (5)
Using SSA's mortality assumptions, the Social Security Trust Fund is going to spend
between 3.27 and 4.32 billion dollars on the ¯rst nine cohorts that were subject to the ETR.
Using the annuitants' assumptions reduces the cost by around 4 billion dollars. But based
on reasonable estimates of a change in earnings, and assuming that \would{be" late claimers
continue to claim at their NRA the Trust Fund is likely to start saving money starting with
8Kestenbaum et al. (1999) estimate that bene¯ciaries aged 65 to 69 whose bene¯ts are recomputed the
average increase in monthly bene¯ts is $13 for men and $11 for women. According to Loughran and Haider
the ETR increased earnings by about 30 percent for men and 20 percent for women, so that a naive estimate
equal to 30 percent of $13 for men and 20 percent of $11 is reassuringly quite close to my estimate.














i(in%) 2.1 2.9 3.6 2.1 2.9 3.6 2.1 2.9 3.6 2.9
1935 0.86 1.03 1.15 0.32 0.59 0.78 0.07 0.17 0.25 5,618
1936 0.85 1.02 1.15 0.32 0.59 0.78 0.07 0.17 0.25 5,603
1937 0.63 0.82 0.96 0.04 0.34 0.55 0.07 0.17 0.25 4,043
1938 0.64 0.82 0.96 0.06 0.35 0.56 0.09 0.19 0.27 3,760
1939 0.42 0.62 0.77 -0.18 0.13 0.35 0.10 0.20 0.28 2,221
1940 0.43 0.62 0.75 -0.16 0.14 0.35 0.12 0.22 0.29 2,092
1941 0.23 0.43 0.58 -0.37 -0.07 0.15 0.14 0.23 0.30 964
1942 0.24 0.43 0.56 -0.34 -0.05 0.16 0.15 0.24 0.30 946
1943 0.07 0.26 0.40 -0.54 -0.24 -0.02 0.16 0.24 0.31 61
Total 4.12 5.53 6.46 -0.64 1.75 3.36 0.86 1.61 2.14
-Panel C 3.27 3.92 4.32 -1.49 0.14 1.22
Notes: The change that is due to an increase in earnings, and therefore contributions is based on estimates
taken from Loughran and Haider 2005. Their estimated e®ect of the ETR on earnings for men (women)
aged 65-69 is equal to $2100 ($500). The break{even change in earnings represents the average change in
earnings needed to cover the average between Panel A's and Panel B's estimated cost.
the 1941 cohort.
3 Conclusions
Following the 2000 ETR, several papers have analyzed its e®ect on labor supply, but despite
the di±cult ¯nancial situation of the Trust Fund, its e®ect on SSA's ¯nances is still unknown.
Using intermediate assumptions in terms of both real interest rates and mortality rates, I
¯nd that for the 1935 cohort the Trust Fund increased its spending by about 4 billion dollars
as a result of the ETR. However, because of increasing life{expectancy, higher actuarial
adjustments for late claiming, and increasing NRA, these e®ects are decreasing over time,
and for workers born in 1943, the additional cost is probably close to zero. At the same
time, the ETR is believed to have signi¯cantly increased earnings and therefore contributions
18between the NRA and age 69. Using estimates from Loughran and Haider (2005), I ¯nd that
each cohort contributes additional 0.20 billion dollars as a result of the ETR. Nevertheless,
the Trust Fund appears to have increased it's liabilities towards the ¯rst workers who were
subject to the ETR. But for workers born after 1941 the Trust Fund seems to actually have
saved money. If workers maximize their family utility function, by a revealed preference
argument, the ETR has been for workers born after 1941 Pareto{improving. There are two
reasons that suggest that removal of the remaining part of the earnings test (between age
62 and the NRA) is unlikely to produce larger costs. First, if we believe that after age 62
disutility from work is increasing with age, labor supply between age 62 and the NRA is
going to respond even stronger to an ETR. Second, mortality between age 62 and the NRA
is low, especially because the additional removal would a®ect much younger cohorts, and
the actuarial adjustments are high. Thus, most workers are better o® claiming around the
NRA. For these workers, earlier claiming is likely to produce lower long{term spending for
the Trust Fund. These results suggest bene¯ts for repealing the remaining portion of the
earnings test.
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21A Data
Health and Retirement Survey I use the 1992-2002 waves of the Health and Retirement
Survey, a biyearly panel survey of around 13,000 individuals aged 51 to 61 in their ¯rst
wave. I delete observations of those who get disability bene¯ts. In order to obtain
the exact date of claiming, I use the retrospective information. However, I restrict
the sample to workers who claimed after 1992 and use only the ¯rst wave following
the claiming date. Finally, I discard observations for which no exact measure of the
monthly claiming age can be established.
SSA's Master Bene¯ciary File http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/microdata
Annuity tables Data extracted from Johansen (1997).
Cohort-speci¯c life tables O±ce of the Actuary of the Social Security Administration Data-
base
B How the \65 spike" became the \NRA spike"
Notice that the 1938 cohort's second spike is at 65 and 2 months and not 65 (Fig. 4).
The reason for this is that for that cohort, the NRA increased by two months. The 1983
amendments scheduled a yearly increase in the NRA starting with the 1938 birth cohort. The
NRA will reach age 66 for workers born in 1943. After a 10 year break, the rise will resume
and stop at age 67 for workers born in 1960 or later. Given this evidence, when forecasting
claiming behavior for future retirees, I will assume that the second spike coincides with the
NRA.
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Figure 4: Hazard rates for cohort 1924, 1937 and 1938. Based on 1%
of SSA's Master Bene¯ciary Data.
C Cohort-speci¯c annuity tables
In order to generate cohort-speci¯c annuity life tables, I follow an approach that is slightly




x¡1(x;y) to be respectively the periodic and the cohort-speci¯c mortality probabilities for





x¡1(x;2000) to get q
0p






x¡1(x;1995) to get the cohort-speci¯c mortality rates.
I use an alternative approach. Since log-odds, LO = log(
q
1¡q) = ® + ¯x are linear in age
(see Fig.5), the di®erence in the periodic mortality between annuitants and the population
is equal to ®0 ¡ ® + (¯0 ¡ ¯)x, which can be easily estimated using OLS.










c(x;y) + b ®
0 ¡ b ® + (b ¯
0 ¡ b ¯)x
= LO
c(x;y) ¡ 0:54679439 + 0:00028393x for men
= LO
c(x;y) ¡ 1:0997845 + 0:00803148x for women : (7)
Finally, I interpolate the life tables using a spline to get monthly probabilities. Figure 5






























































Figure 5: Periodic mortality probabilities, and log odds for annuitants,
the general population and the implied \low mortality" population.






































Figure 6: Survival probabilities conditional on age 65. SSA estimates
have a solid line.
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